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Abstract -- As wireless LAN (WLAN) technologies proliferate, it
is becoming common that ad hoc networks, in which mobile
devices communicate via temporary links, are built using WLAN
products. In the IEEE 802.11b standard, the Wired Equivalent
Privacy (WEP) scheme is used as the only measure to enhance
data confidentiality against eavesdropping. However, owing to the
well known pitfalls in Initialization Vector (IV) attachment in the
ciphertext, the underlying 40-bit RC4 encryption mechanism in
WEP is unsafe regardless of the key size. On the other hand, solu-
tions involving replacement of RC4 by another cipher are not
attractive because that may lead to reconstruction of the whole
system and result in high costs as well as redevelopment of the
products. In order to enhance the security on the existing develop-
ment efforts, we propose a novel multipath routing approach to
combat the link insecurity problem at a higher protocol layer.
This approach does not require the application to use sophisti-
cated encryption technologies that may be too heavy burdens for
mobile devices. Based on our suggested confidentiality measure-
ment model, we find that our proposed multipath ad hoc routing
technique, called Secure Multipath Source Routing (SMSR), is
highly effective.
Keywords:  wireless ad hoc network, WEP, confidentiality, eaves-
dropping, multipath model, SMSR.
I.  INTRODUCTION
Wireless networking technologies, such as WLAN (e.g.,
IEEE 802.11b) schemes, are rapidly proliferating, and as such,
people are aggressively making use of such technologies to
built ad hoc networks. In an ad hoc network, mobile devices
wander autonomously and communicate via temporary links.
Such freedom is widely envisioned to be an attractive model
for many interesting applications, such as wireless gaming,
location based services, etc. Specifically, each mobile device
dynamically discovers other devices nearby within each
other’s radio range so that it can directly communicate with
them. For those devices that are far apart, it relies on other
devices as routers to relay packets. In this paper, we focus on
ad hoc networks built based on the IEEE 802.11b short range
wireless standard.
Security is a major concern in wireless networks. In the mul-
tiple access control (MAC) layer, the IEEE 802.11b standard
specifies the Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) to enhance data
confidentiality against causal eavesdropping in the sense that it
provides functionality equivalent to that provided by the physi-
cal security attributes inherent to a wired medium [5]. As is
standardized internationally, WEP has been widely imple-
mented and integrated into IEEE 802.11b products for public
use. Basically, WEP relies on an encryption key and a 24-bit
initialization vector (IV). The encryption key is shared within
all authorized users but the IV is locally handled by each
source device and newly selected for every packet. Specifi-
cally, WEP uses RC4 encryption mechanism on the key and the
IV to generate a 40-bit keystream. The keystream is then
XORed with the plaintext for encryption to produce the cipher-
text. The clear IV is finally attached and transmitted with the
ciphertext. It is assumed that even though an eavesdropper can
capture the ciphertext successfully, he/she cannot interpret it to
the plaintext if he/she does not have the encryption key.
Indeed, eavesdropping can be a serious problem in wireless
ad hoc networks. By definition, eavesdropping means any
unauthorized interception of information-bearing traffic and
involves various kinds of both passive and active attacks. In
case of wireless ad hoc networks, since all mobile devices use
the shared wireless medium, users are exposed to a potentially
insecure environment and under eavesdropping in a more com-
plex manner than wired networks. Furthermore, because ad
hoc networks involve rapid changes in topology and delegated
controls among all mobile devices, it is difficult to track down
the eavesdropper (as illustrated in Fig. 1). Although WEP is
originally designed to prevent eavesdropping, previous
research has shown that, WEP has failed to meet its design
goal owing to the deficiency in clear IV attachment in the
ciphertext [1], [2], [4], [12]. The IEEE 802.11b design commu-
nity has also admitted the failure of the WEP. The community
attributes to the use of the underlying 40-bit RC4 encryption
mechanism and suggests that WEP could achieve its aim to
enhance confidentiality by increasing the keystream size to
104-bit or 128-bit. However, WEP is unsafe regardless of the
size of the keystream due to its weakness in the initialization
vector (IV).
The severity of the IV problem depends on the re-occurrence
of the IV. For 24-bit IVs, the IVs as well as the keystreams are
limited to a small space of 224 variations. Statistical data shows
that the full IV key space will be exhausted after 5 hours when
1, 500 bytes packets are transferred at 11 Mbps [12]. The key-
streams will also be used up and thereafter the IV collections
will be re-used. Another noticeable point is that, as is in
802.11b, the replacement of IV is optional, which could make
the IV problem more threatening because of oversimplification
of designs. Take a common Lucent wireless card as an exam-
ple, the same predictable IV setting is repeated every initializa-
tion. A network using many wireless cards of this type will
suffer a huge amount of IV collisions and also very high risk of
statistical attacks [1], [2].
Another approach, which is replacing the RC4 mechanism
by another cipher may lead to reconstruction of the whole sys-
tem, and thus incur high investment as well as redevelopment
of the wireless products. The performance of the new cipher
also requires test and exploration. 
In order to conserve the existing development efforts but
enhance data confidentiality, we propose a novel multipath
routing approach to combat the eavesdropping at the network
layer. Instead of focusing on the encryption aspect, our pro-
posed approach is to construct a multipath model to deliver
data over disjoint multiple routes. Data are systematically split
among the routes to minimize or even disable potential cap-
tures by unauthorized users. There are four major merits in our
Figure 1: Eavesdropping in an ad hoc network.
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method:
• Our model is implemented on the network layer and thus, 
WEP on the MAC layer is free to be conserved or 
replaced. This provides high compatibility to the existing 
network and allows freedom for further development. 
• In the proposed model, security is enhanced not only to 
prevent problems in IV, but also to extensively avoid vari-
ous kinds of active and passive attacks. 
• Splitting data among the multiple paths simplifies the 
security problem and provides the foundation for the upper 
layers for security-sensitive applications. 
• Recent researches on multipath routing have been very 
successful and the various ad hoc routing protocols sug-
gested are efficient in terms of delay, bandwidth, data loss, 
and path recovery. These advances definitely have great 
synergies with the proposed model in this paper.
The paper is organized as follows. We briefly outline some
existing approaches in tackling the IV problem in Section II.
Section III describes the framework of the multipath model.
Section IV shows the design and construction of the SMSR
protocol. Section V presents and discusses the simulation
results. Finally, Section VI concludes this paper.
II.  EXISTING SOLUTIONS
It is well known that there have been two solutions proposed
to solve the IV problem: increase the key size or replace the
RC4 cipher. The first approach proposes to increase the size of
the keystream from 40-bit to 104-bit or 128-bit. Although this
method can undoubtedly avoid bruce-force attacks and prevent
an eavesdropper breaking the keystream, it provides little help
for WEP because with clear IV attachment, an eavesdropper
can still recognize those ciphertexts using the same keystream
without breaking it. Thus, a large key size is much less essen-
tial. The second approach proposes to replace the RC4 stream
cipher by another cipher and therefore remove the known XOR
weakness of stream cipher. An eavesdropper then cannot get
the plaintext by XOR’ing two ciphertexts with the same key-
stream. This approach is effective to solve the IV problem, but
would at the same time demands the necessity of redesigning
the overall system, which may inevitably brings the consider-
ation of the redevelopment difficulty and the high cost. 
Both approaches have focused on the MAC layer in provid-
ing a solution to enhance confidentiality in ad hoc networks.
However, the proposed solutions are either hard to implement
or ineffective in practice. Besides, enhancing confidentiality by
only encryption is not absolutely secure. With advance in com-
puter technology, it is possible to break any encryption upon
collection of sufficient information. These observations moti-
vate our new notion to consider confidentiality enhancement in
view of the network layer. 
III.  THE PROPOSED MULTIPATH FRAMEWORK
Our proposed algorithm is stimulated by the two detrimental
facts with link insecurity in the single path model (thereafter is
called as unipath model for simplicity), which uses only one
path for data delivery:
• Huge amount of ciphertexts following the same path/link 
will facilitate the interception by an eavesdropper and 
eventually provides sufficient information for decrypting 
the ciphertexts, e.g. by XOR’ing two ciphertexts in WEP 
problem previously mentioned.
• If an encryption is broken by an eavesdropper, then a large 
flow of information delivered in the same path/link will be 
completely decrypted and exposed. 
In order to minimize these two potential hazards of unautho-
rized decryption with the unipath model, we propose a solution
implemented on the network layer to enhance confidentiality.
Our approach is to construct multiple paths between a source
and a destination and distribute data among the routes to mini-
mize or even disable potential captures by unauthorized users.
The idea is illustrated in Figure 2, which shows the multipath
model greatly reduces the number of potential successful
eavesdropper. 
To achieve this aim, we studied a similar research of W. Lou
and Y. Fang’s theoretical multipath framework but on stable
networks [8], which is the only piece of related research to our
best knowledge. There are two major points with [8]: 
• a secret sharing coding ensures that one can decrypt the 
whole message only if he/she captures a certain amount 
out of the total shares; 
• a multipath routing algorithm can further extend the col-
lection of cached paths by exchanging with neighbors. 
In general, [8] emphasizes the encryption coding to achieve
the goal in enhancing security but the model in this paper
focuses more in the multipath routing algorithm. This is
because in wireless ad hoc environment, even an eavesdropper
is not served as a router to relay the packet, he/she can still cap-
ture packets from other mobile devices within his radio ranges.
Therefore, multipath routing algorithm which affects the distri-
bution of paths determines the effectiveness of the model in
enhancing confidentiality as well. We have then built up a new
model with two components in framework: a sequencing
scheme and a multipath routing algorithm especially for ad hoc
wireless networks.
A.  Sequencing Scheme
Sequencing scheme concerns about how to distribute the
data to different routes so as to enhance confidentiality. In
other words, with sequencing scheme, even the eavesdropper
can capture part of the shares, he/she cannot interpret the
whole message. The model with [8], however, cannot be
directly implemented in ad hoc environment where routes are
limited because the secret sharing coding which tolerates the
disclosure of part of shares, introduces unfavorably high redun-
dancy to a resource limited network environment. Instead, the
polynomial scheme in [8] or any other coding techniques (e.g.
diversity coding [11]) can be modified to minimize unneces-
sary redundancies for ad hoc networks. In this paper, the
approach is to rearrange the order of the data and redistribute
the data among shares. An eavesdropper who captures parts of
data can only interpret meaningless information. For the recip-
ient, he/she can reconstruct the original data in the correct
sequence only when all data shares are received. Since there
exist many applicable encryption techniques, this paper only
focuses on building a secure multipath routing algorithm.
Figure 2: Eavesdropping in a multipath ad hoc network.
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B.  Multipath Routing Algorithm
In wireless ad hoc networks, the distribution of paths deter-
mines the confidentiality level. The further apart the routes, the
harder the eavesdropper can capture the data shared. In order to
achieve the best performance in confidentiality enhancement,
the goal of the multipath routing algorithm in this paper is to
find and utilize totally disjoint paths. The proposed mulitpath
routing algorithm in [8] is based on stable networks and
focuses on theoretically the number of paths found which may
require further analysis for implementing in the complex ad
hoc environment. On the other hand, the existing effective
multipath routing algorithms usually aim at finding multiple
dependent paths as backup for unipath. Very few are designed
for simultaneous data transfer among multiple paths. Totally
disjoint multipath routing is seldom described. Therefore, this
paper contributes in constructing a secure totally disjoint multi-
path routing model based on one of the ad hoc routing proto-
col, which is discussed in more details in the coming section.
IV.  THE PROPOSED MULTIPATH ALGORITHM
Ad hoc routing protocols are classified into two main
streams: table-driven and on-demand. Table-driven protocols
try to maintain all route entries in a table from time to time,
though some of the routes are not required. It usually requires
periodic updates by control messages to prevent stale entries.
In contrast, on-demand protocols initiate a route discovery only
when needed, which can minimize the number of control mes-
sages but sacrifices the knowledge of the whole topology.
Since the on-demand protocols are more adaptive to the
changes and more efficient, we use one of the on-demand pro-
tocol, Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) [3], [6] as the base in
our model. 
DSR uses source routing, which means that the source
knows the complete route to the destination. The route infor-
mation is stored in a cache and carried in the header of every
packet. If a source wants to communicate with a destination
that it does not have an entry, it initiates a route discovery pro-
cess by flooding a route request (RREQ) to each neighbor.
After receiving the RREQ, each node checks whether it is the
destination or it has the route entry in the cache. If either case
fulfills, it then issues a route reply (RREP) following the
reverse path to the source. If not, it continues to broadcast until
a route is found or the destination is reached. In case of route
breakage, the node discovering the breakage sends a route error
(RRER) to the source. The source then eliminates the corre-
sponding entry in the cache and initiates a new route discovery
if necessary.
To facilitate the multipath routing mechanism, two models
are studied, which are Split Multipath Routing, (SMR) [7] and
Multipath Extension to DSR [9]. The SMR model was based
on DSR and focused on achieving QoS routing by maintaining
maximally disjoint routes. However, SMR could not be applied
to serve our aim because of two major reasons. First, the model
employs special forwarding techniques for finding more maxi-
mally disjoint paths in route discovery, which in our case will
unfavorably introduce high number of unnecessary control
messages. Second, since the major concern of the model is
QoS routing, it limits the number of paths to two for each pair
of connection and in case of route breakage, allows one route
to continue to deliver data. These designs adversely lower the
level of security. Therefore, we have to reconstruct the model
for both the route discovery and route maintenance. The other
model in [9] is also focused on QoS routing in DSR but on
alternative paths. Although this model provides multipath dis-
covery, it uses only one path for transmission. The alternative
dependent paths in cache are used only as backup in case of
route breakage. Based on our confidentiality requirement, we
propose a new multipath model, Secure Multipath Source
Routing (SMSR) with the details as follows:
A.  Parameters
There are two main parameters in the SMSR model which
allow the system to adapt to the dynamic ad hoc environment.
With suitable adjustment, the multipath model can balance
between throughput and the number of disjoint paths returned
to the source which determines the level of security. The two
parameters are:
• Maximum waiting time, : 
It determines the initial value of the time counter for the 
period that the destination should wait after receiving the 
first RREQ. As the value of the counter diminishes to 
zero, the destination should have received RREQs carry-
ing information of different routes. The destination then 
selects the shortest one and the next totally disjoint ones 
for data delivery by sending RREP to the source in reverse 
routes. This parameter controls the waiting time of desti-
nation before selection and thus determines the number of 
routes received as well as the security level. A larger value 
allows a larger pool of route candidates for selection but 
introduces unnecessary delay. It is noticeable that this 
parameter is set as a reference value according to the first 
RREQ received. This can provide flexibility to adapt to an 
adverse environment or a large network.
• Maximum hop difference between the shortest path and 
the totally disjoint paths, : 
It is another parameter required in the destination. It serves 
as a standard to select the routes with acceptable perfor-
mance in terms of delay. After the maximum waiting time 
counter diminishes to zero, the destination needs to select 
firstly the shortest route and then all other totally disjoint 
paths. Although our primary aim of the multipath model is 
to use totally disjoint paths for security reason, the perfor-
mance is also essential. This parameter regulates the hop 
difference versus security. Similar to ,  is also set as a 
range relative to the shortest route serving the same pur-
pose.
B.  Route Discovery of SMSR
Similar to DSR, SMSR uses source routing with all routing
records stored in a cache and the route information carried in
the packet header. If an intermediate node receives a RREQ for
the first time, it broadcasts the RREQ again; otherwise, it dis-
cards the RREQ. Unlike DSR, the intermediate nodes are not
allowed to send RREP to the source even it has route entries in
its cache. The same procedures continue until the RREQs
reach the destination. After receiving the first RREQ, instead
of replying immediately with the shortest route, the destination
waits for  to receive other RREQs. Together with all RREQs
coming from different routes, the destination node has the
whole picture of the network and finds the suitable routes: the
shortest path and then all totally disjoint paths within the value
of the hop difference parameter, . 
With the two parameters previously mentioned, our model
allows dynamic selection of routes to maintain a standard of
the throughput. To implicitly control the total number of replies
to prevent reply flood, the destination only sends route reply
(RREP) of selected paths to the source. The source then sends
data through the selected totally disjoint paths to the destina-
tion. Compared with DSR where the destination sends RREP
to the source for all RREQ received, SMSR only replies the
selected paths.
τ
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C.  Route Maintenance of SMSR
When one of the paths breaks, the source is notified by
RRER. However, instead of initiating a new route discovery
immediately, the broken path is discarded without recovering
by an alternative and the remaining paths continue to deliver
data. Although records of the alternative paths can be found in
the cache of destination as back up, we do not use them to pre-
vent stale entries. The remaining paths then continue to deliver
data until there is only one route remains. Then, a new route
discovery is initiated. Since our primary goal is to maintain at
least two paths for enhancing confidentiality, another route dis-
covery is initiated even though the last remaining path is
robust. 
D.  Confidentiality Measurement
To measure the confidentiality enhancement by the multi-
path model, a random node is selected as an eavesdropper. It
performs the same as other nodes to relay packets but it col-
lects unauthorized data within its radio range. Owing to the
sequencing scheme, only that all shares of a message are cap-
tured by this eavesdropper are defined as a successful attack.
There is a counter set for an eavesdropper to calculate these
amount of the data successfully captured. The data later is
divided by the total amount of data received successfully by
the destination and thus interpreted as the interception ratio to
indicate the effectiveness of the multipath model in enhancing
confidentiality: 
(1)
where  is the interception ratio,  is the total number
of packets successfully eavesdropped, and  is the total
number of packets arrived at the destination. 
V.  PERFORMANCE RESULTS
The performance of the following two models are evaluated
and compared:
• DSR: Dynamic Source Routing which uses single path; 
and
• SMSR: Secure Multipath Source Routing which uses mul-
tiple paths.
Our simulation focuses on comparing the multipath model
with the unipath model. The simulation scenario contains 50
mobile devices, which are randomly located in a 
square meters area. Each node has a 300 meters propagation
radius and randomly chooses a speed between 0 and 10 m/s
towards a random direction. The size of the payload is 512
bytes. The maximum waiting time  is 10 ms. The maximum
hop difference between the disjoint paths and the shortest path,
 is 6. A random node is selected as an eavesdropper and the
number of packets it captured is measured as intercepted pack-
ets for calculating the interception ratio. Cases with different
payloads are simulated and the following factors are recorded
for analysis:
• Interception ratio: the main indicator for the effectiveness 
of security enhancement by the multipath model.
• Throughput: defined as the total number of bytes received 
successfully by the destination per second.
• Control overhead: defined as the total number of bytes of 
the routing packets per second, including RREQ and 
RREP.
• End-to-end delay: defined as the total end-to-end delay 
including queuing delay and propagation delay. 
Below, we show the simulation result according to the met-
rics mentioned. 
Figure 3 shows the average interception ratio of each proto-
col. We can observe that the interception ratio of SMSR
remains about 0.3 and that of DSR stays about 0.5. The overall
performance of SMSR outperforms the DSR by about 20%.
Since DSR uses only one path to deliver data, an eavesdropper
along the path is able to capture all information. For SMSR, the
data are split and transmitted in distributed fashion, so an
eavesdropper can only capture the data transmitted within his
radio range and capturing all parts of the data should be
extremely difficult. Since we employ the sequencing scheme,
the eavesdropper can only interpret meaningless contents. This
result confirms our multipath model has achieved its aim to
enhance confidentiality from unipath model.
Figure 4 depicts the throughputs of DSR and SMSR. It is
shown that the SMSR scheme outperforms DSR, especially
when the load increases. In DSR, the only route used is the
shortest one. When the route breaks, it tries to use a cached
route overheard at first. If this attempt fails, then it will dis-
cover a new route. For the former case, intermediate nodes
with cached routes send RREPs to the source to provide the
cached routes. However, as DSR provides no updating meth-
ods to these caches, it is possible that the source cannot find the
cached routes are stale upon route breakage until when it tries
to use the involved route. This introduces more data loss as
well as delay. In SMSR, multiple routes are used, means SMSR
delivers more packets than DSR. Besides, in case of route
breakage, even though SMSR have almost all routes break but
leaving at least two available routes to the destination, the
remaining routes can still continue to transmit the data. There-
fore, SMSR can tolerate frequent topology changes. Although
we can even achieve a higher tolerance for allowing one route
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Figure 3: The system average interception ratio.
Figure 4: The system average throughput.
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to continue to deliver data, we set the minimum available paths
to be two so as to achieve our aim to share data among multiple
paths for security.
Figure 5 shows the routing load required for each model,
which measures the protocol efficiency. It can be seen that the
overheads required for SMSR is higher than that for DSR and
both curves follow the similar trend as the payload increases.
The result is the same as predicted brought by the overheads
required for route discovery of multiple paths and packet
sequencing. First, DSR allows intermediate nodes to send
RREP with route information from cache directly to the
source, which minimizes overhead flooding. Second, the over-
heads increase for sequencing controls in order to share data
among multiple routes and reconstruct the data at the destina-
tion. It is also noticeable that the overhead is higher than the
throughput when high load for both DSR and SMSR, which is
similar to the results obtained in [7] and [10]. The major factor
contributing to the increase in overheads is that as traffic
increases, both DSR and SMSR experience more route discon-
nections and route discoveries. The source then floods the net-
work with excessive RREQs for path reconstruction and
lowers the protocol efficiency.
Figure 6 illustrates the average end-to-end delay. We can
observe that the overall performance of SMSR is more steady
than that of DSR. Although SMSR and DSR performs equally
well on light traffic, the difference becomes evident as traffic
load increases. In general, DSR has shorter end-to-end delay
since it always delivers data on the shortest route. However,
DSR suffers longer delays in path maintenance to reconstruct
routes. On the other hand, though SMSR uses longer path to
deliver data, the connection remains as long as there are at least
two routes left. Since the SMSR uses only totally disjoint
routes, this ensures the independence of each path in case of
path breakage. Breaking of one path does not necessarily affect
other paths. Thus, unnecessary path recovery is minimized.
This result further demonstrates the robustness of the SMSR by
providing multiple routes.
In this section, the simulation results indicate that the perfor-
mance of a multipath model, SMSR outweighs that of a uni-
path model, DSR in preventing eavesdropping. We also show
the other performance benefits the multipath model bears.
VI.  CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a multipath model is proposed to enhance data
confidentiality in IEEE 802.11b based ad hoc networks, in the
presence of the WEP problem. Our model SMSR is generic
and can be easily applied in existing IEEE 802.11b networks.
Our simulations, using the DSR protocol for comparisons,
show that the successful interception ratio by eavesdropper has
been lowered by over 20% with the multipath model than that
with the traditional unipath model. Significant improvements
in end-to-end delay and throughput are also achieved with the
multipath model, especially during heavy traffic. Thus, our
proposed multipath model is an effective and practicable
scheme to enable secure data communications in an ad hoc net-
work. We are currently working on the analytical and quantita-
tive comparisons of the security impacts of different ad hoc
multipath routing protocols.
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